social improvement. Viewed as an epistemological object 'food security' does tremendous work to make land deals possible; it is constitutive, rather than merely reflective, of the social practices that make land grabs happen.
The argument in this paper runs as follows. In the first section I briefly sketch what is known about land grabs -the underlying drivers of the process, the main target regions, the principal investors, and the scale of acquisitions. Next I try to pinpoint exactly what is novel about the present rush to acquire foreign land. In focusing on 'novelty' I want to be clear that I am not eschewing the very obvious historical parallels to be drawn. The point here is to recognise the historic specificity of the present and to give adequate weight to the array of embryonic social practices that in time may calcify into new 'norms' and 'accepted' patterns of action. Building on this discussion the final part of the paper turns to four discursive tactics that underpin land grabs. My argument is that these discourses produce a social reality without which land deals simply would not be possible. The symbolic power of this 'food security' discourse is therefore as important as the socio-economic and political dynamics elaborated in the first part of the paper.
The new 'farms race'
'Land grabs' are here defined as the transfer of the rights to own, use or control land through its sale, lease or concession. The International Land Coalition (ILC), an alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organisations, further observes that land grabs differ from 'ordinary' land acquisitions in the following respects: first, they do not entail the 'free, prior and informed consent' of the dispossessed; second, investors seldom conduct impact assessments on the likely social, economic and environmental consequences; third, the contracts that seal these deals are either vague or nonbinding; fourth, land deals often go hand-in-hand with violations of human rights, especially the rights of women and minority populations; and fifth, most deals are secured without democratic participation or independent oversight (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 11, 18) .
The scale of the new land deals is equally noteworthy. Counting only acquisitions over 200 hectares (note this figure is 10 times the size of an archetypal small farm), and only deals transacted on and after the year 2000, the report concluded that 203 million hectares of land -an area over 8 times the size of the United Kingdom -has been sold or leased to states, commercial farmers, and private investors. Significantly 66% of all land grabs are in sub-Saharan Africa, although sizeable acquisitions have also been agreed in Latin America, the Ukraine, Southern Russia, Southeast Asia and Australia (HLPE 2011, 9; Oxfam 2012, 5) .
There are many factors driving this significant wave of investment (cf. Cotula, Vermeulen et al 2009; FAO 2012; UNCTAD 2013) . Certainly food price squeezes and urban unrest have played a role (see Figure 1) . From 2007 the Gulf States in particular faced exorbitant food bills as the cost of importing provisions soared. Foreign land acquisitions thus became an exit strategy from import dependency by firstly enabling these states to bypass an increasingly volatile global food economy; and secondly, ensuring access to future food supplies via the vertical integration of primary production. This is the practice that Philip McMichael (2013) helpfully terms 'agro-security mercantilism'. It represents a (re)turn to supra-market mechanisms to ensure stable supplies of food, fodder, fiber and fuel.
A second factor is the real and perceived endowment constraints of nation-states.
The government of China, for example, is presently getting to grips with the enormous challenge of having to feed 22% of the world's population with only 9% of the planet's arable land (GRAIN 2008, 3) . This problem is magnified by the fact that China, and indeed other growth economies, are consuming increasing amounts of meat, fish, fruit, and dairy products as they adopt the dietary patterns of the affluent West (OECD 2009, 32) . Anxieties over population growth, the 'protein bomb', and dwindling resources are unleashing new geopolitical forces. In Saudi Arabia diminishing water reserves forced the government to abandon its programme for food self-sufficiency. Low stocks of arable land in countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have encouraged these states to 'off-shore' their food production (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 37) . In each case, foreign land acquisitions are seen as a solution to looming domestic pressures. While states have a role in facilitating land grabs it is clear that the big player is private capital. Here it is important to distinguish between the activities of the agro-food firms and financial capital. The former include, for example, Japanese, Indian, and Arab companies -the 'second-tier' of the food industry -who see land grabs as an opportunity to gain parity with more established market leaders. GRAIN (2008, Finally, the structural transformation of the energy economy to accommodate fuel derived from biomass has helped accelerate land grabs. As the world's largest consumer of oil, the USA has set a target of replacing 30% of its fuel needs with agrofuels by 2030. A similar EU directive stipulates that 10 per cent of transport fuels must be supplied from 'renewable' sources by 2020; the expectation is that 80-90% of this target will be met from biofuels (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 26) . The targets set by the US and EU reflect a wider trend; 40 out of 50 countries consulted in a recent survey had already enacted legislation to promote bio-fuels (Smith 2010, 3). The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2030 global agro-fuel consumption is set to reach 250 billion litres of gasoline equivalent per year (IEA 2011, 23) . For supply to match demand more land needs to be brought into production. ActionAid (2010, 19) calculates that EU countries have already 'secured or requested 5 million hectares of land for industrial biofuels in developing countries.' Data drawn from the Land Matrix paints a similar picture: the highest demand for land investments come from agrofuels, comprising 40% of the area acquired where the commodity grown is known (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 24) .
Focusing on 'non-x'
From this thumbnail review it should be evident that land grabs mark a point of rupture in the management of agricultural resources (for a fuller discussion cf. Nally 2012). To specify this rupture more clearly I want to foreground four ways that land deals promote a new neo-liberal governance structure over land and land-based resources. these developments suggest that we should accept the reality of land grabs and work collectively to mitigate their worst effects. For Olivier de Schutter loose governance frameworks of this kind simply finesse the details of land grabs -they suggest that it is okay to 'destroy the peasantry' so long as one accomplishes this 'responsibly' (de Schutter, 2011, 275) . The overall effect -handing foreign entities the right to use national resources (something that was, until recently, forbidden in many countries cf. 
How to authorise a land grab
In final part of this paper I want to delineate the legitimating strategies that make land grabs possible. To frame this discussion I begin with some remarks by George Orwell (2002 ([1946 , 963) on the politics of language: To Orwell's list of 'exhausted idioms ' (2002 [1946] , 964) one would have to add the term 'food security,' widely used from the mid-1970s to denote strategies to boost food supplies and nowadays invoked in debates on everything from famine relief to future climate change. In these discussions, 'food security' is commonly presented as an ideologically neutral concept, a pre-political idea that is moreover a global good. Similar to modern humanitarian reason (Fassin 2012, 3) the concept galvanises public empathy and in the process it re-narrates a relationship of dominance (the governance of precarious lives) as one of assistance (the provision of a remedy). Below I fasten on just four strands of contemporary 'food security' discourse in order to show how political speech is bent to 'defend the indefensible'.
Closing yield gaps
The authors of the World Bank's report on land deals, entitled Rising Global Interest in Farmland, claim that much of the agricultural land in the global South, and especially in Africa, is 'unutilized' and could be targeted for a 'productivity increase' via foreign investment: 'None of the African countries of most interest to investors,' the report asserts, 'is now achieving more than 30% of the potential yield on currently cultivated areas' (Deininger, Byerlee, et al 2011, xiv; Li 2011, 294) . To illustrate this point the report is peppered with maps and tables that show 'the maximum potential value' (Deininger, Byerlee, et al 2011, 78; Li 2011, 282 ) that could be realised on each continent if the land was repurposed for intensive commercial farming.
The Global Harvest Initiative (GHI), an industry-led advocacy group that includes DuPont, Elanco, IBM, John Deere and Monsanto, embraces the same 'yield gap' arguments. GHI's annual GAP Report™ includes a GAP Index™ that aims to quantify the difference between the present rate of agricultural productivity and the pace required to meet future needs. The report is replete with shiny graphics (see Figure 2) and 'hard facts' that make a convincing case for more large-scale commercial farming.
The story is also one of tipping points -2050 and 9 billion people -after which it may be too late to mitigate the worst effects of population increases, climate change and dwindling resources. If the plough is to rein in the stork (Arnold 1988, 39) , so the argument goes, we must embrace a new agricultural revolution.
Similarly DuPont's Advisory Committee on Agricultural Innovation and Productivity
for the 21st Century assures readers that the company is committed to addressing the 'food productivity gap' and furthermore counsels that 'stakeholders remain focused on the question of how to adequately raise productivity to meet the world's food needs, rather than get distracted by historic disputes, such as biotechnology versus traditional crop breeding, organic farming versus conventional farming, or food versus fuel production' (Dupont Advisory Committee 2011, 5-6). Note that organic agriculture is contrasted with 'conventional farming' by which the committee mean large-scale industrial agriculture.
Observe too that concerns about biotechnology and using land to 'grow fuel' -while over 800 million people around the world are undernourished -are dismissed as 'historic disputes.' The urgency of producing more food to save lives means that almost every other concern can be suspended. scarcity' is relative rather than an absolute category. Indeed, it is well established that enough food exists to feed in excess of the world's current population (OECD 2009, 21) .
The logic of depeasantisation
In an exemplary article on land grabs, anthropologist Tania Li links the 'yield gap' argument to the desire to engineer a general 'exit from agriculture' in the global South. arrangements, not by policies to promote self-sufficiency.' According to GHI (2011, 16) 'trade is the mechanism that links supply to demand, and trade liberalization plays an essential role in promoting global food security by making the international food system more efficient.' The New Vision for Agriculture promoted by the World Economic Forum (2013) also prioritises market-based approaches to food security and poverty reduction.
As the report rather awkwardly asks: 'With the models employed, are smallholders able fully to participate in the market, or are most still mainly at the subsistence level?'
The implicit contrast between market participation ('good') and subsistence agriculture ('bad') is not, however, a straightforward one. Agriculture is a business. Seed is a business, fertiliser is a business, storage, value added, logistics and transport -it is all about business' (Green 2013, np) . If land deals can accelerate the transition to marketization, then by this logic they should be vigorously pursued.
The power of solicitude
According to Neil Crowder at Chayton Capital, land deals are inspired by a desire to care
for the stricken and neglected. 'The important thing to note,' says Crowder, 'is that we are focusing on investments that will serve the continent's own growing consumer We provide employment for approximately 4,000 people, and recognize that our people are our most valuable asset. We provide education, medical services, sanitation and housing for these workers and their families, supporting a community of over 45,000. We also provide the community infrastructure, including roads and electricity supplies. Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013), rather than merely being responses to the latter.
For this very reason abundance and scarcity, security and insecurity, need to be theorised and grasped as interdependent phenomenon.
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